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I. INTRODUCTION
Texas courts continue to define the boundaries of franchise law with
decisions regarding procedure, enforcement of contractual terms, intel-
lectual property, common law and statutory claims, and remedies. Cases
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during this Survey period address a range of pertinent topics from the
field of franchise law, such as Texas courts’ willingness to enforce choice-
of-law and arbitration provisions in franchise agreements, burdens of
proof for parties seeking injunctive relief, hurdles facing claimants under
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), and many other impor-
tant developments. This Survey’s selected cases and analyses will provide




Courts in Texas continue to enforce choice-of-law provisions in
franchise agreements. In Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC v. 4 Box LLC, the U.S
District Court for the Northern District of Texas applied the franchise
agreements’ Tennessee choice-of-law provision despite certain franchis-
ees’ arguments that the provision was invalidated by their respective
states’ franchise relationship laws.1 In Gigi’s, franchisees from Minnesota,
North Dakota, Indiana, and Ohio argued that the application of their
franchise agreements’ Tennessee choice-of-law provision would violate
the public policies of those states.2 Specifically, the franchisees argued
that because those states had franchise relationship laws that afforded
them greater protection than Tennessee law and because they were de-
prived of some of the benefits of the application of those franchise rela-
tionship laws, the choice-of-law provision must be invalidated.3
The district court emphasized that in Texas, choice-of-law agreements
are enforceable.4 In order to render the choice-of-law provision unen-
forceable, the franchisees had the burden to show that Tennessee law: (1)
had no substantial relationship to the parties’ transaction or other reason-
able basis for application; or (2) that the application of Tennessee law
was:
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the par-
ticular issue and which, under the rule of [Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws] § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.5
The franchisees argued that the choice-of-law provision violated the pub-
lic policies of their respective states.6 The district court then analyzed
whether: (1) the franchisees’ states had a more significant relationship
1. Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC v. 4 Box LLC, No. 3:17-CV-3009-B, 2018 WL 6068817, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2018). Deborah S. Coldwell, Iris Gibson, and Sally Dahlstrom re-
present Gigi’s and certain of its affiliates in this matter.
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id. (citation omitted).
6. Id. at *2.
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with the parties’ relationship and transaction at issue than Tennessee; (2)
the franchisees’ states had a materially greater interest than Tennessee in
the determination of a particular issue; and (3) whether the franchisees’
states had a fundamental policy that would be contravened by the appli-
cation of Tennessee law.7 The district court explained that in order to
invalidate the choice-of-law provision all three of the questions must be
answered affirmatively.8
The district court held that the franchisees failed to meet their burden
to establish that a state other than Tennessee had a more significant rela-
tionship with the parties and transaction at issue.9 Thus, the district court
applied Tennessee law to the parties’ claims.10 On rehearing, the district
court withheld ruling on whether the application of Tennessee law barred
the franchisees’ franchise relationship.11 The district court explained that
it would determine if the claims were barred by the Tennessee choice-of-
law following additional discovery and presentation of evidence.12
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Obtaining a preliminary injunction may sometimes be difficult in Texas
and places a “heavy burden” on the party seeking the preliminary injunc-
tion. In BL Restaurant Franchises LLC v. 510 Park Inc. in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas, Bar Louie, franchisor of
the Bar Louie restaurant system, sought a preliminary injunction against
a franchisee requiring it to comply with pre-termination procedures
under the parties’ franchise agreement.13 Specifically, the franchisee
claimed that Bar Louie failed to perform under the franchise agreement
and the franchisee gave notice that it intended to close its franchised res-
taurant.14 The franchisee subsequently closed the franchised restaurant.15
Under the parties’ franchise agreement, the franchisee was required to
give the franchisor written notice of any breach and an opportunity to
cure.16 No such notice and opportunity was provided.17 Thus, the
franchisor argued that it was entitled to injunctive relief requiring the
franchisee to reopen and comply with pre-closing procedures.18
The parties’ franchise agreement gave Bar Louie the right to injunctive
relief regardless of whether Bar Louie met the applicable standard for
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id. at *4.
12. Id.
13. BL Rest. Franchises LLC v. 510 Park Inc., No. 3:18-CV-0971-B, 2018 WL 2363606,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2018).
14. Id. at *2.
15. Id. at *1.
16. Id. at *2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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obtaining a preliminary injunction in certain circumstances.19 Bar Louie
argued that, under the circumstances, it was entitled to a preliminary in-
junction under the franchise agreement regardless of whether it met the
applicable standard for preliminary injunctions.20 However, the provision
of the franchise agreement related to preliminary injunctions only pro-
vided for injunctive relief when a franchisee improperly used proprietary
marks, confidential information, or both.21 The district court held that
requiring notice of breach of the franchise agreement and opportunity to
cure did not relate to the use of proprietary marks or confidential infor-
mation.22 Thus, the franchisee’s adherence to pre-closing provisions of
the franchise agreement did not fall within the provision of the franchise
agreement, and Bar Louie was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on
this basis.23
Bar Louie also argued that it was able to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion without the franchise agreement provision. The district court empha-
sized the high burden for obtaining this “extraordinary and drastic
remedy” and the high burden on the movant.24 In order to obtain a pre-
liminary injunction, the movant must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that it will suffer irrepa-
rable injury absent the injunction; (3) that the threatened injury out-
weighs any harm the injunction might cause the defendants; and (4) that
the injunction will not impair the public interest.”25 The franchisees ar-
gued that Bar Louie was unlikely to succeed on the merits because it
breached the franchise agreement, the franchisees did not breach the
franchise agreement, and Bar Louie could not prove damages.26 The
franchisees alleged Bar Louie breached the franchise agreement by fail-
ing to provide adequate training and support and failing to communicate
marketing and advertising plans and ideas.27
The district court held that Bar Louie did not meet its heavy burden of
persuasion that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the mer-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The franchise agreement provided: “Franchisee recognizes the unique value
and secondary meaning attached to the System, the Proprietary Marks, standards of opera-
tion and Confidential Information (collectively ‘Proprietary Property’), and Franchisee
agrees that any non-compliance with the terms of this Agreement or any unauthorized or
improper use of the Proprietary Property will cause irreparable damage to Franchisor and
its franchisees. Franchisee therefore agrees that if it should engage in any such unautho-
rized or improper use of the Proprietary Property, either during or after the Term,
Franchisor shall be entitled to permanent and temporary injunctive relief, without bond,
from any court of competent jurisdiction, in addition to any other remedies to which
Franchisor may be entitled by law or at equity.” Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *1 (quoting Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009)).
25. Id. (quoting Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, 442 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id. at *3.
2019] Franchise Law 159
its.28 Bar Louie argued that there was no provision of the franchise agree-
ment requiring it to support the franchisees in the ways they alleged.29
However, at the preliminary injunction stage, the district court held that
even without a provision requiring Bar Louie’s support, Bar Louie did
not refute that it failed to provide such support.30 The district court also
held that Bar Louie did not respond to the argument that the franchisees
were not required to comply with the pre-closing conditions.31
Thus, the district court denied Bar Louie’s request for a preliminary
injunction.32 This case demonstrates the high burden applicable to mov-
ants seeking a preliminary injunction. Parties seeking a preliminary in-
junction must be prepared to provide sufficient evidence to meet the high
burden in order to be successful.
C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In KF Franchising, Ltd. v. Tasone Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas held that because a Texas state court had ruled
on personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff franchisor could not seek to litigate
the case in federal court.33 In this case the franchisor brought breach of
contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark and copyright in-
fringement, violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, unfair
competition, and breach of non-compete agreements claims.34 Prior to
this district court case, a Texas state court dismissed all these same claims
except the breach of contract claim for “want of jurisdiction.”35 The dis-
trict court here held that, though the Texas state court dismissal did not
use the words “personal jurisdiction,” it was a ruling on personal jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction.36
D. ARBITRATION
Arbitration provisions continue to be enforced in franchise agreements
in Texas. In Charging Bison, LLC v. Interstate Battery Franchising & De-
velopment, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
when a dispute arises over the applicability of an arbitration provision,
the dispute should be resolved in favor of arbitration.37 Here, the parties






33. KF Franchising, Ltd. v. Tasone Inc., No. H-17-3849, 2018 WL 1865921, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 18, 2018). Deborah S. Coldwell and Taylor Rex Robertson represented KF
Franchising in this matter.
34. Id. at *1–2.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Charging Bison, LLC v. Interstate Battery Franchising & Dev., Inc., 711 F. App’x
232, 232 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
38. Id.
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The arbitration clause had a carveout for disputes involving the propriety
of a termination.39 The franchisee argued it was entitled to termination
because the franchise agreement was procured by fraud.40 The franchisor
demanded arbitration.41 Emphasizing the importance of arbitration
agreements, the Fifth Circuit ruled that “the plain meaning of [the
carveout provision] does not cover anticipatory termination of the
franchise agreement.”42 Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling that the arbitration must proceed.43
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION,
AND NONRENEWAL
Failure of a franchisee to abide by pre-termination obligations set forth
in its franchise agreement prior to closing a franchised location may not
be sufficient to entitle a franchisor to injunctive relief in Texas courts.44
As noted above in the procedural analysis of BL Restaurant Franchises
LLC v. 510 Park Inc.,45 Bar Louie, franchisor of the Bar Louie restaurant
system, filed a motion for preliminary injunction in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas against its franchisee, seeking to
require the franchisee to re-open the Bar Louie location it operated in
the Uptown neighborhood of Dallas, Texas, because the franchisee closed
the location prior to fulfilling the pre-termination requirements in its
franchise agreement.46 The franchisor argued that the franchise agree-
ment expressly authorized injunctive relief, regardless of whether
franchisor could show the four elements required to establish a common
law right to injunctive relief.47
The franchisor argued specifically that two sections of the franchise
agreement authorized injunctive relief to compel the franchisee to reopen
the restaurant and comply with the pre-termination provisions of the
agreement. Section 19.3 of the franchise agreement provided that the
franchisee may not terminate the agreement prior to the expiration of its
term, except through arbitration, based upon a material breach of the
agreement by the franchisor, and, further, that the franchisee must pro-
vide the franchisor with written notice of its claim within one year of
when it believed the franchisor materially breached the agreement and it
must allow the franchisor sixty days to cure.48 Likewise, section 22.1 pro-
vided that, under specific circumstances, the franchisor was entitled to






44. See BL Rest. Franchises LLC v. 510 Park Inc., No. 3:18-CV-0971-B, 2018 WL
2363606, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2018).
45. Id.
46. Id. at *2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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[was] entitled by law or at equity.”49 The franchisor argued that violation
of the pre-termination provisions was a circumstance triggering injunctive
relief under section 22.1, but the district court disagreed. Rather, the dis-
trict court held that section 22.1 applied only to “[p]roprietary
[p]roperty,” defined as intellectual property, confidential information,
and other information and processes related to the systems and methods
for operating a Bar Louie franchise.50 Because the franchisee’s noncom-
pliance with the pre-termination procedures of section 19.3 did not impli-
cate any of the proprietary interests contemplated by the injunction-
triggering provisions of section 22.1, the district court concluded that
franchisor was required to meet the higher common law standard for in-
junctive relief to apply.51
While ultimately unsuccessful in this case, the franchisor’s argument
that its franchise agreement provided an independent basis for injunctive
relief could serve as a template for more effective injunctive provisions in
future franchise agreements. Pairing an express entitlement to injunctive
relief with standard provisions regarding termination rights would pro-
vide an easier path to enforcement of contract rights than attempting to




Courts in Texas continue to take seriously the continued use of a
franchisor’s licensed marks post-termination in violation of the Lanham
Act. In Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded $757,746.75 for
lost profits, $120,996.01 for actual damages, and $33,395.50 for attorneys’
fees.53 In Choice Hotels, a franchisee continued to use licensed marks af-
ter termination in violation of the parties’ franchise agreement.54 Specifi-
cally, the franchisee continued to use road signs and photographs on
third-party booking websites with the franchisor’s licensed marks.55
The franchisor instructed the franchisee not to use its licensed marks
and the district court had permanently enjoined the franchisee from using





52. Id. at *3.
53. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-15-2355, 2018 WL 2317604,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2018).
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The district court held that the franchisee’s use of the licensed marks
was a violation of the Lanham Act and that the franchisor was entitled to
(1) lost profits; (2) actual damages; and (3) attorneys’ fees.58
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. FRAUD AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Fraud claims in the franchising context generally arise in the sales pro-
cess when a franchisee believes that the value of the franchise was mis-
represented by the franchisor’s sales agent. But fraud claims can also
arise at other stages, for example when a franchisee attempts to transfer
its franchise and the transferee believes that it was fraudulently induced
into purchasing the franchise. Such was the case in Saenz v. Gomez,
which involved a franchisee’s secret transfer of a franchise without the
required written consent of the franchisor.59
Saenz entered into a franchise development agreement with Pizza Pa-
tro´n, which granted him the exclusive right to develop Pizza Patro´n res-
taurants within a defined area in Texas.60 Saenz owned at least four Pizza
Patro´n locations, which he financed through three loans that were cross-
collateralized and secured by blanket liens over the assets of his four lo-
cations, including a location in Rio Grande City.61 Under the franchise
development agreement, Saenz was prohibited from transferring the
franchise without Pizza Patro´n’s written consent.62 Gomez and Saenz en-
tered in negotiations for Gomez to purchase the Rio Grande City Pizza
Patro´n franchise.63 During these negotiations, Saenz represented that he
was the corporate representative for Pizza Patro´n in the South Texas re-
gion, which was untrue, and provided Gomez with various financial docu-
mentation, including inaccurate profit and loss income statements.64 The
parties entered into a purchase-sale agreement, whereby Gomez pur-
chased all equipment and inventory for the Rio Grande City location for
$350,000, a purchase price just over the amount Saenz owed the bank.65
No one obtained consent from Pizza Patro´n, and the deal closed.66 Saenz
lied about the actual purchase price to his bank, which allowed Saenz to
keep the balance instead of paying off the loans to the bank, and contin-
ued to hide the transfer from Pizza Patro´n.67 Gomez operated the store
for about a year when he ceased operations due to health concerns and
declining sales.68 Gomez sued Saenz and various others, including
58. Id. at *3.
59. Saenz v. Gomez (In re Saenz), 899 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2018).
60. Id. at 387.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 387–88.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 388–89.
68. Id. at 389.
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franchisor Pizza Patro´n, in state court, alleging fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, breach of contract, common law fraud, and conversion.69 Pizza Pa-
tro´n was subsequently dismissed and Saenz filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy.70 The state lawsuit was removed to bankruptcy court, which
held trial and found in favor of Gomez on the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion and common law fraud claims and allowed an exception from the
bankruptcy discharge.71 After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
decision, Saenz appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting the finding of common law fraud and the bankruptcy court’s de-
termination that the judgment was nondischargeable. After first
determining that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to liquidate a state
claim from discharge, which is discussed below, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment on
the fraud claims.72
Saenz argued that there was no evidence of justifiable reliance, a re-
quired element for a Texas common law claim, because there were red
flags and that the facts presented were insufficient to support a finding of
proximate cause.73 The Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments. First, the
Fifth Circuit determined that the reliance element does not require a
demonstration of reasonableness, but that a plaintiff cannot rely on a rep-
resentation if there are red flags that indicate that reliance is not war-
ranted.74 With respect to the bankruptcy court’s finding, the Fifth Circuit
found that:
Not only did Saenz make credible representations, he also went to
great lengths, including falsifying bank documents, to prevent
Gomez from questioning his authority to effectuate the franchise
transfer. Without any reason for Gomez to question Saenz, his in-
come statements, and his claim that he worked for Pizza Patro´n cor-
porate, the bankruptcy court concluded the weight of the evidence
supported justifiable reliance. We do not have a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed in this respect.75
The Fifth Circuit next dismissed Saenz’s argument that there was no evi-
dence of proximate causation, which requires cause in fact and foresee-
ability.76 The Fifth Circuit explained that cause in fact is established if the
injury would not have occurred “but for” the wrongful act or omission.77
Furthermore, foreseeability “requires that the injury [complained of] be
of such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated,
and that the injured party should be so situated with relation to the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 389 n.7.
71. Id. at 389.
72. Id. at 391–93.
73. Id. at 392–93.
74. Id. at 392 (citing AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d
391, 418 (5th Cir. 2001)).
75. Id. at 393.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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wrongful act that injury to him . . . might reasonably have been fore-
seen.”78 The Fifth Circuit found that there was no error in the bankruptcy
court’s conclusion that Gomez’s injuries were foreseeable and directly at-
tributable to Saenz’s misrepresentations regarding the inflated profits in
the income statements and Saenz’s corporate status within the
franchisor.79
The franchisee’s ability to transfer its franchise rights to a third party is
crucial to the franchisee because this enables a franchisee to sell their
business, retire, or pass their business on to their family. Most franchisors
want control over this process, while most franchisees want to convey
their franchises freely. While the facts of Saenz are unique in the transfer-
ring franchisee’s efforts to keep the transfer secret, this case serves as a
useful reminder for franchisors to keep up-to-date records of franchisee
ownership and to enforce the franchise agreement provisions that require
the franchisor be notified and have the right to approve any transfer.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The distinction between independent contractors and employees con-
tinues to be an issue for franchisors, particularly in the cleaning franchise
industry. The consequences of misclassifying individuals as independent
contractors can be quite severe. For example, being deemed an employee
instead of an independent contractor has significant consequences for the
franchisor, including the potential for vicarious liability. In addition, em-
ployment classification impacts several federal statutes, including the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Americans with Disabilities Act, Family
Medical Leave Act, and National Labor Relations Act. A misclassifica-
tion claim under the FLSA was at issue in Fernandez v. Jani-King Inter-
national, Inc.80 In Fernandez, individual franchisees filed suit against Jani-
King International, Inc., Jani-King, Inc., Jani-King of Houston, Inc., SCT
Enterprises, Inc., and Rocket Franchising, Inc. (collectively JaniKing De-
fendants) under the FLSA for unpaid overtime and minimum wage viola-
tions.81 The JaniKing Defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that
plaintiffs were franchisees, not employees, and that the FLSA therefore
did not apply.82
The JaniKing Defendants first argued that franchisees could not state a
plausible claim of employer liability under the FLSA, because the com-
plaint grouped all defendants together in a conclusory manner without
explaining how an employment relationship existed as to each of the de-
fendants.83 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
78. Id. (quoting In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1258, 1279
(N.D. Tex. 1989), aff’d, 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991)).
79. Id.
80. No. H-17-1401, 2018 WL 539364, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018).
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2.
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agreed and determined that franchisees’ allegations that “[d]efendants”
as a group employed them was insufficient to state a plausible claim for
joint-employer liability under the FLSA, which requires that the com-
plaint alleges “some facts at least of the employment relationship” to set
forth a “facially plausible claim of multiple employer liability under the
FLSA.”84
The JaniKing Defendants, in reliance on the order of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which dismissed the FLSA
claims asserted by business entities,85 next argued that plaintiffs were not
“individuals” for purposes of FLSA liability because the franchise agree-
ments with franchisor were entered into by corporate entities, not indi-
vidual plaintiffs in their individual capacities.86 The district court rejected
this argument, which it considered “convoluted” given plaintiffs’ allega-
tions that they, as individuals, were employees of the JaniKing Defend-
ants apart from the existence of the franchise agreement.87 In addition,
plaintiffs alleged that they provided “janitorial cleaning services” for the
JaniKing Defendants’ customers, which the district court agreed was
enough to plausibly state that franchisees were “individuals” under the
FLSA.88
Next, the JaniKing Defendants argued that the franchisees did not al-
lege sufficient facts to render the franchisor an employer under the
FLSA, because the allegations stated nothing more than a franchisor-
franchisee relationship.89 The district court rejected this argument and
determined that “[t]he mere fact that parties to an FLSA case are also
parties to a franchise agreement does not render a plaintiff’s FLSA . . .
claims not plausible.”90 Rather, the definition of an employer under the
FLSA as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee”91 is “an expansive one, with ‘strik-
ing breadth.’”92 The district court next applied the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’s economic reality test to determine a party’s status
as an employer under the FLSA.93 Under this test, courts evaluate
“whether the alleged employer: (1) possessed the power to hire and fire
the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules
or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of pay-
84. Id. (quoting Kaminski v. BMW Sugar Land Partners, No. H10-551, 2010 WL
4817057, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2010)).
85. The decision of the Western District of Oklahoma was later overruled by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which held that the fact that some franchisees are
LLCs does not preclude their coverage under the FLSA. See Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla.,
Inc., 905 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2018).
86. Fernandez, 2018 WL 539364, at *2.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2019).
92. Fernandez, 2018 WL 539364, at *3 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)).
93. Id.
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ment, and (4) maintained employment records.”94 The district court de-
termined that plaintiffs’ allegations were enough to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs alleged that the JaniKing
Defendants:
[N]egotiated contracts with customers, retained rights to inspect
[p]laintiffs’ work, prohibited [p]laintiffs from engaging in other
cleaning business without written authorization, retained rights to re-
quire [p]laintiffs to undergo checks and drug testing, required them
to wear Jani-King uniforms, retained rights to establish policies and
procedures, required [p]laintiffs to undergo training, assigned con-
tracts to the franchisees at their discretion, retained the right to per-
form all billing and accounting functions, invoiced all cleaning
services directly to customers, and paid [p]laintiffs any money owed
to them.95
The district court determined that these allegations, which must be taken
as true for purposes of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, were enough to
meet at least two elements (factors two and three) of the economic reality
test.96 Although the district court found that plaintiffs’ allegations had
not been found to meet the other two elements per se, the allegations did
have some bearing on the power to hire and fire and to supervise and
control employee work schedules and conditions of employment.97
Therefore, the district court determined that plaintiffs’ allegations were
enough to plausibly state a claim of employer status under the economic
reality test.98
Finally, the JaniKing Defendants argued that the franchisees did not
sufficiently allege the actual work they did that would entitle them to
overtime pay under the FLSA.99 The district court agreed that the fran-
chisees alleged only generalized, conclusory allegations that they worked
more than forty hours a week without overtime pay and that plaintiffs
therefore failed to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim.100 The district
court granted plaintiffs leave to amend to allege on a defendant-by-de-
fendant basis a plausible employment relationship, as well as the factual
circumstances that support their allegations that give rise to the overtime
provisions in the FLSA.101
The FLSA requires non-exempt employees to be paid a minimum wage
and overtime and requires employers to keep certain pay records. Under
Fernandez, individuals who create corporate entities that perform work
as franchisees can be found to be employees under the FLSA. In addi-
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mean that the worker is not an employee under the FLSA; rather, the
legal determination is made using the economic realities test. Fernandez
also demonstrates that franchisors should consider whether the controls
imposed by franchise agreements could create unwanted employment
relationships.
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
Franchisees generally qualify as “consumers” under the DTPA, which
gives franchisees the ability to assert claims for treble damages and attor-
neys’ fees.102 Failure-to-disclose claims under the DTPA’s laundry list
often arise in the franchise context, where franchisees contend that they
were induced to enter into a franchise agreement based on a franchisor’s
omission of material information. But, as Ferreira v. Russell103 demon-
strates, this material information must be known by the franchisor at the
time of the transaction. Ferreira involved an oral agreement for the oper-
ation of a “Paw Depot” franchise to sell holistic pet supplies.104 The only
written agreement between the franchisor and franchisee was titled a
“noncompete agreement” that referred to a fee for “$35,000 per one
franchise zone.”105 The parties also orally agreed for franchisor’s con-
struction company to build-out the store, which the parties planned to
complete in sixty to ninety days.106 Franchisee believed that the $35,000
in the noncompete agreement included “a Paw Depot franchise and a
completely built-out store, including shelves stocked with the product.”107
Franchisor believed that the $35,000 was for the franchise alone, and that
the franchisee would also pay the construction costs.108 Unexpected con-
struction delays occurred and franchisor requested an additional $10,000
to complete the build-out.109 Franchisee refused, hired a new contractor,
and opened the store under another name.110 Franchisee also sued
franchisor, franchisor’s wife, and franchisor’s construction company, al-
leging several “laundry list” DTPA violations based on the construction
delays and franchisor’s alleged failure to disclose that surplus and repur-
posed materials would be used for construction.111 After the trial court
entered judgment against the franchisor for damages and attorneys’ fees
based on failure to disclose under Section 17.46(b)(24) of the DTPA,
franchisor appealed, arguing that there was not legally sufficient evidence
102. See AdvoCare Int’l, L.P. v. Ford, No. 05-10-00590-CV, 2013 WL 505210, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 5, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
103. No. 05-16-01235-CV, 2018 WL 3829231, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 13, 2018,
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to support the trial court’s finding.112
The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed that there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish a DTPA violation. To prevail on a DTPA claim for
failure to disclose under Section 17.46(b)(24), a plaintiff must prove the
following elements: “(i) a failure to disclose material information con-
cerning goods or services that was (ii) known at the time of the transac-
tion, (iii) intended to induce the consumer into a transaction, and (iv)
that the consumer would not have entered had the information been dis-
closed.”113 The court determined that there was no evidence that
franchisor had knowledge at the time of the agreement that the construc-
tion delays would occur.114 The court determined that the fact that con-
struction delays later arose or that franchisor acknowledged to franchisee
that the sixty-day estimate was optimistic was not evidence that
franchisor had knowledge of the delays at the time the oral franchise
agreement was entered into.115
As to franchisee’s argument regarding nondisclosure that surplus and
repurposed materials would be used, the court also found that there was
insufficient evidence to establish a DTPA violation under Section
17.46.116 The court first reiterated that mere nondisclosure of material
information is not enough to establish a DTPA claim.117 Rather, the in-
formation must be withheld for the intent of inducing the franchisee into
entering into the franchise agreement.118 Moreover, the court determined
that there must be direct evidence of intent to induce, which cannot be
presumed.119 Finding that there was nothing in the parties’ testimony or
surrounding circumstances that would raise a reasonable inference of in-
tent to induce, the court determined that there was insufficient evidence
to support this theory as well.120
Ferreira is a reminder that mere nondisclosure of material information
is not enough to establish an actionable claim under the DTPA. Rather,
failure-to-disclose claims must establish that the material information was
known at the time of the transaction and that this information was with-
held with the intent of inducing the franchisee into entering into the
franchise agreement.
B. BANKRUPTCY
A bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over causes under Title 11, as well
as core proceedings that “arise under title 11” or that “arise in a case”
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *3.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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under Title 11.121 Bankruptcy judges have jurisdiction to hear and enter
final judgment in core matters.122 Non-core matters, by contrast, are
those that could exist outside of bankruptcy that do have some effect on
the bankruptcy. A common example of a non-core matter is a franchisor
or franchisee’s state law claim against the other party for breach of the
franchise agreement or fraud, which is a creature of state law. With re-
spect to non-core matters, a bankruptcy judgment may only “submit pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,” with
the judgment entered by the district court.123 If all parties to the proceed-
ing consent, however, the bankruptcy court may enter a final judgment in
a non-core proceeding.124 Saenz v. Gomez, discussed above, considered
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the transferee fran-
chisee’s state law fraud claims.125 In Saenz, the bankruptcy court deter-
mined that it had jurisdiction and constitutional authority over the state
law claims because the case involved a “core” matter.126 In the alterna-
tive, the bankruptcy court concluded that even if the state law claim was
not a core matter, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction because the par-
ties consented to jurisdiction.127 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found no error in the bankruptcy court’s determination that the
parties consented to jurisdiction to enter a final judgment.128 The Fifth
Circuit, however, declined to consider whether the case involved “‘core’
matters” to “issue a final judgment that liquidates a state law claim ex-
cepted from discharge.”129
In addition to jurisdictional issues, Saenz also considered the dis-
chargeability of the state law fraud claim. Chapter seven liquidation is a
principal means used by franchisees to discharge their debts. The Bank-
ruptcy Code authorizes a broad discharge with the intent to provide a
fresh start to honest but unfortunate debtors. Notwithstanding this broad
discharge, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth certain debts
that are nondischargeable, including debts obtained by actual fraud.130 In
Saenz, Gomez asserted actual fraud as a basis for nondischargeability of
the bankruptcy court’s judgment under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code.131 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court’s
finding that all elements of the Section 523(a)(2)(A) claim were satis-
fied.132 The Fifth Circuit explained that the elements of “actual fraud”
generally correspond with the elements of common law fraud in Texas.133
121. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2019); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2019).
122. Id. § 157(b)(1).
123. Id. § 157(c)(1).
124. Id. § 157(c)(2).
125. Saenz v. Gomez (In re Saenz), 899 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2018).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 391.
129. Id. at 390.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2016).
131. In re Saenz, 899 F.3d at 393–94.
132. Id. at 395.
133. Id. at 394.
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For the same reasons that fraud was found, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the elements for actual fraud for nondischargeability were also
met.134
A debtor’s litigation claims are often valuable assets of the bankruptcy
estate. But if a debtor does not include specific and unequivocal language
preserving its claims and causes of action against third parties post-confir-
mation, standing to pursue these claims will be lost. Whether the plan
documents properly preserved a franchisee’s post-confirmation claims
against its franchisor was at issue in Lauter v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.135 In
this case, debtor Gas-Mart USA (Gas-Mart) and Citgo Petroleum Corpo-
ration (Citgo) entered into a Marketer Franchise Agreement in Septem-
ber 2013.136 In July 2015, franchisee Gas-Mart filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy and in March 2016, Gas-Mart rejected all of its executory
contracts, including the franchise agreement with Citgo.137 In September
2016, a liquidation plan was confirmed. The plan provided for establish-
ment of a creditor trust; appointment of the plaintiff as trustee of the
creditor trust authorized to pursue causes of action; and transfer of estate
assets, including causes of action, to the creditor trust.138 Plaintiff Lauter,
as the creditor-trustee of Gas-Mart, filed suit against Citgo for breach of
contract, violation of the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court, and
avoidance of a preferential transfer.139 The trustee contended that Citgo
took actions after Gas-Mart declared bankruptcy, which caused Gas-
Mart’s reorganization attempts to fail.140
Citgo argued that the plan documents did not adequately preserve the
trustee’s breach of contract and stay violation claims.141 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas determined that “specific and
unequivocal” language is required to preserve a claim under U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit law.142 The district court also found that
the plan documents were sufficiently “specific and unequivocal” to pre-
serve the breach of contract claims against Citgo because the plan docu-
ments mentioned contract claims as preserved and identified Citgo as a
potential defendant.143 Although the breach of contract claim was pre-
served, the district court determined that the trustee did not have stand-
ing to assert claims for post-petition breach of contract because of Gas-
Mart’s rejection of the franchise agreement.144 The breaches alleged, in-
cluding Citgo’s not supplying fuel, creating unreasonable restrictions of
fuel allocation, and failing to comply with the other terms of the franchise
134. Id. at 394–95.
135. No. H-17-2028, 2018 WL 801601, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2018).
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *1–2.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *11.
142. Id. at *6–9.
143. Id. at *10.
144. Id. at *15.
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agreement, all occurred post-termination and after Gas-Mart rejected the
franchise agreement.145 As to plaintiff’s claim for violation of the auto-
matic stay, the district court determined that the plan documents did not
preserve this claim because the documents did not mention stay viola-
tions.146 The fact that Citgo may have had actual knowledge of a claim for
violation of the stay was irrelevant since the issue was governed by the
plan documents and what claims the plaintiff preserved on notice to
creditors.147
C. LIQUOR LAWS
States take the primary role in regulating the sale and distribution of
alcoholic beverages within their borders. Texas has a three-tier system of
alcohol regulations. Producers, distributors, and retailers are required to
remain independent and without any financial interests in each other.
Texas vigorously enforces these regulations. Texas statutes prohibit pub-
licly-traded companies from selling liquor; Texas is the only state in the
nation with such a law. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Bever-
age Commission, Wal-Mart brought a constitutional challenge against
four Texas statutes governing the issuance of package store permits,
which allow the retail sale of liquor in Texas.148 These statutes prohibit
public corporations, such as Wal-Mart, from obtaining package store per-
mits and prohibit other companies with diffuse ownership from obtaining
more than five of these permits.149 Wal-Mart argued that these statutes
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
and sought both a declaration that these statutes were unconstitutional
and a permanent injunction against their enforcement.150 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas agreed and declared that the
public corporation ban violated the Commerce Clause and issued a per-
manent injunction.151
Under the public corporation ban at issue, any entity owned or con-
trolled in part by a public corporation is forbidden from holding a pack-
age store permit in Texas and therefore cannot sell liquor.152 Under the
statute, a public corporation is defined as a corporation whose shares are
on a public stock exchange or in which more than thirty-five persons hold
an ownership interest.153 The Texas Package Store Association argued on
behalf of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission that the public cor-
poration ban was necessary to promote “accountability” and to have real
humans close to the business who will bear ultimate personal responsibil-
145. Id.
146. Id. at *11.
147. Id. at *12.
148. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 313 F. Supp. 3d 751,
756 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 786.
152. Id. at 758.
153. Id.
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ity for the actions of the liquor store.154 The district court determined that
there was no evidence of actual problems with corporate accountability
and the public corporation ban had a discriminatory purpose to exclude
out-of-state companies in order to benefit locally-owned package
stores.155 The district court determined that while the public corporation
ban did not have a discriminatory effect because public corporations are
banned from the market whether or not they are based in Texas or owned
by Texas,156 the ban places “burdens on interstate commerce that exceed
the burdens on intrastate commerce.”157 The district court determined
that only a very small percentage of in-state companies that wanted to
engage in the retail sale of liquor were prevented from doing so by the
public corporation ban and that a very large percentage of out-of-state
companies were blocked.158 In determining whether a legitimate local
purpose for the public corporate ban existed, the district court agreed
that the Texas legislature had an interest in reducing the availability and
consumption of liquor.159 However, the increased prices caused by the
public corporation ban could have been achieved by less discriminatory
alternative means, including an excise tax.160
Pending an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
liquor in publicly owned stores in Texas, including Wal-Mart, Costco, and
other giant retailers could become a reality. If publicly traded companies
are allowed to sell liquor, existing law still requires these companies to
build separate facilities, although they can be next to existing stores.
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As discussed above, in Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Frontier Ho-
tels, Inc., Choice Hotels filed suit against a franchisee for continuing to
use Choice Hotels’ “COMFORT” family of registered trademarks (i.e.,
COMFORT INN®) after the franchise agreement was terminated—and
even after a court issued a permanent injunction against the franchisee’s
use of the trademark.161 Under the Lanham Act, Choice Hotels was enti-
tled to the franchisee’s profits for the infringement,162 and it was the fran-
chisee’s burden to prove any elements of costs or deductions—something
the franchisee failed to even address.163 To determine the proper amount
of damages, the U.S. District for the Southern District of Texas examined
154. Id. at 761.
155. Id. at 768–69.
156. Id. at 766.
157. Id. at 774 (quoting Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Pine Belt Reg’l Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2004)).
158. Id. at 775.
159. Id. at 776.
160. Id.
161. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-1502355, 2018 WL 2317604,
at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2018).
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id.
2019] Franchise Law 173
the franchisee’s profit-loss information from December 2014 through
February 2016, and, because the franchisee did not provide the same in-
formation from March 2016 through August 2016, the district court relied
on Choice Hotels’ estimate of the franchisee’s profits and loss based on
the prior year.164 The district court accepted franchisor’s calculations and
stated that franchisor was entitled to $252,582.25, representing the fran-
chisee’s profits from the relevant period.165 The district court awarded
treble damages of $757,746.75, three times the franchisee’s profits, based
on the franchisee’s continued use of the marks after Choice Hotels issued
multiple warnings, sent a termination letter, and filed the lawsuit—which
the court concluded was intentional infringement.166
Finally, the district court awarded Choice Hotels actual damages in the
form of reasonable royalties.167 The franchise agreement obligated the
franchisee to pay Choice Hotels 9.5% of its gross room revenue from the
relevant period as a franchise fee,168 which the court calculated to be
$1,273,642.23 by referencing both the franchisee’s actual total income
from December 2014 through February 2016 and the estimated income
from March 2016 through August 2016.169 Applying the franchise fee per-
centage, the district court awarded Choice Hotels $120,996.01 in actual
damages.170
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Injunctive relief is considered an extraordinary remedy, and courts
place a high burden on parties seeking injunctions or restraining orders.
As noted in preceding sections of this Survey, the franchisor of the Bar
Louie restaurant system sought a temporary restraining order and prelim-
inary injunction to force a franchisee to comply with pre-termination pro-
cedures in the franchise agreement.171 The agreement could only be
terminated if an arbitrator found that Bar Louie had materially breached
the agreement,172 and the franchisee was required to provide Bar Louie
with written notice within one year of any alleged breach and allow sixty
days for Bar Louie to cure.173 Instead, the franchisee notified Bar Louie
that it intended to close the restaurant before the end of the term, and
Bar Louie sought an injunction requiring the franchisee to reopen the
restaurant and comply with the pre-termination procedures.174 In re-
sponse, the franchisee argued Bar Louie had materially breached the
164. Id. at *1–2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *2–3.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *3.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. BL Rest. Franchises LLC v. 510 Park Inc., No. 3:18-CV-0971-B, 2018 WL 2363606,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2018).
172. Id. at *2.
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franchise agreement by failing to provide adequate support—an allega-
tion that Bar Louie curiously did not refute.175 Bar Louie instead made
the vague declaration that not every breach warranted repudiation by the
other party.176 The franchisee also argued that it had not technically “ter-
minated” the franchise agreement, noting that it closed the restaurant
“simply because it was financially impossible to keep it open”—another
argument that Bar Louie inexplicably provided no response to.177 Since
Bar Louie did not dispute that it failed to provide support to the former
franchisee, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas con-
cluded that Bar Louie had failed to show a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits and thus was not entitled to injunctive relief.178
C. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Courts have significant discretion in determining reasonable awards of
attorneys’ fees. In addition to awarding Choice Hotels actual damages
and three times the franchisee’s profits from the relevant period, the dis-
trict court in Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc. also
awarded Choice Hotels its attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act due to
franchisee’s intentional infringement.179 Excluding the fees that Choice
Hotels estimated were “likely to be billed” in the future, the district court
found that the rates and number of hours for Choice Hotels’ attorneys
were reasonable and awarded $33,395.50 in attorneys’ fees.180
Awards of attorneys’ fees can vary substantially depending on the facts
of individual cases and courts’ interpretations of specific language provid-
ing for awards of fees under various statutes. After the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas denied a franchisor’s request for
three types of injunctive relief in Stockade Companies, LLC v. Kelly Res-
taurant Group, LLC, Kelly Restaurant Group (Kelly) filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.181 However, before the district court
could rule on that motion, the franchisor voluntarily dismissed its claims
without prejudice.182 Kelly then filed a motion with the district court for
its attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing that it was the prevailing party and
the franchisor had dismissed its claims simply to avoid an unfavorable
judgment on the merits.183 Kelly believed its request for attorneys’ fees
was supported by three statutes—Rules 54(d) and 41(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 134A.005 of the Texas Civil Prac-
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tices & Remedies Code—and a provision in the franchise agreement.184
In response, the franchisor first argued that the franchise agreement
required Kelly to submit its claim for attorneys’ fees to arbitration and
that an arbitrator, not the district court, should determine the threshold
question of whether such claim was subject to arbitration.185 Because the
district court had previously found that the franchisor had failed to pre-
sent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate
the question of arbitrability, the district court concluded it could decide
whether the claim was subject to arbitration.186 Because the claim was
collateral to the franchisor’s claim for injunctive relief that was excepted
from the arbitration clause, the district court decided that the claim was
not subject to arbitration.187
The district court next addressed whether Kelly was a “prevailing
party.”188 To be a prevailing party, a “judicially sanctioned change in the
legal relationship of the parties” must have occurred.189 Looking to U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit precedent, the district court noted
that a defendant is generally not a prevailing party when the plaintiff dis-
misses its claims without prejudice.190 Kelly argued the Texas Supreme
Court had recognized an exception where a plaintiff dismisses its claims
“to circumvent unfavorable legal restrictions or rulings.”191 The district
court held Kelly did not prove the exception because the denial of the
motions for preliminary injunctions did not necessarily mean the court
would have granted Kelly’s motion to dismiss.192 Further, the district
court recognized it had granted numerous other motions in favor of the
franchisor earlier in the case and that the franchisor had not abandoned
its claims entirely but chose to pursue them in arbitration instead.193
Even if Kelly had shown it was the prevailing party, the district court
found that Kelly would not have been entitled to relief under any of the
statutes or the language of the franchise agreement.194 First, Rule 54 only
provides the procedure to recover attorneys’ fees; it does not supply the
substantive prerequisites for recovery, which are instead governed by fed-
eral or state law covering the substantive issues in the case.195 Second, by
its own terms, the franchise agreement did not permit Kelly to recover
fees because it only applied to a party that “instituted” a legal proceed-
ing.196 Third, the district court denied recovery under Section
184. Id.
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187. Id. at *3–4.
188. Id. at *4.
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134A.005(1) of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act because Kelly had
failed to show the franchisor’s trade secret claim was brought in bad faith,
which required clear evidence that the claim was entirely without merit
and taken for an improper purpose.197 Finally, the district court held Rule
41(d) did not apply because the rule only applied to two sequential law-
suits—not to a lawsuit and a subsequent arbitration.198 The district court
therefore denied the franchisee’s request for attorneys’ fees.199
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Survey period includes franchise cases from a range of subject
matters, including procedure, franchise-specific contractual relationships,
intellectual property, common law claims, statutory claims, and remedies.
Among the procedural cases, Gigi’s Cupcakes emphasized that Texas
courts will enforce choice-of-law agreements unless 1) no substantial rela-
tionship exists between the parties or the transaction and the state and no
other reasonable basis exists for choosing such a forum; or 2) that en-
forcement of the agreement contravenes the “fundamental policy of a
state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state” in the
determination of the legal issues in dispute.200 BL Restaurant Franchises
indicated that a similarly heavy burden of proof exists where a party
seeks a preliminary injunction to enforce its rights under a franchise
agreement; Texas courts will narrowly construe provisions of a franchise
agreement granting a party a right to injunctive relief.201 In KF Franchis-
ing, the district court held that a plaintiff franchisor could not seek to
litigate in federal court because a Texas state court had already ruled on
personal jurisdiction.202 In Charging Bison, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s enforcement of an arbitration
clause, holding that disputes over the applicability of arbitration provi-
sions should be resolved in favor of arbitration.203
BL Restaurant Franchises surfaced once again in this Survey’s analysis
of the franchise relationship, termination, and nonrenewal. In that case, a
district court held that the franchisor was not entitled to an injunction to
reopen the restaurant at issue under separate provisions of the franchise
agreement concerning termination requirements and protections for the
franchisor’s proprietary property.204 Instead, the district court applied the
much higher common law standard for injunctive relief, concluding that
197. Id. at *6–7.
198. Id. at *7.
199. Id.
200. Gigi’s Cupcakes, LLC v. 4 Box LLC, No. 3:17-CV-3009-B, 2018 WL 6068817, at *3
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201. BL Rest. Franchises LLC v. 510 Park Inc., No. 3:18-CV-0971-B, 2018 WL 2363606,
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202. KF Franchising, Ltd. v. Tasone Inc., No. H-17-3849, 2018 WL 1865921, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 18, 2018).
203. Charging Bison, LLC v. Interstate Battery Franchising and Dev., Inc., 711 F.
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the franchisor could not demonstrate the requisite likelihood of success
on the merits.205
The district court in Choice Hotels International was comparatively
more receptive to that franchisor’s attempts to enforce its intellectual
property rights with injunctions and extensive damages awards. In that
case, the district court awarded the franchisor over $900,000 in lost prof-
its, actual damages, and attorneys’ fees, finding that the franchisee vio-
lated the Lanham Act by continuing to use the franchisor’s licensed
trademarks after the franchise agreement had terminated—and even af-
ter being enjoined by the court.206
This Survey’s analysis of common law claims included cases addressing
fraud and unfair competition, as well as vicarious liability. In Saenz, a
franchisee fraudulently sold his pizza franchise to an unwitting buyer by
forging the business’s income statements and misleading the buyer as to
the franchisee’s relationship to the franchisor.207 Although the franchisor
was dismissed from the case, the issues addressed by the Fifth Circuit are
a useful reminder for franchisors to keep current records of franchisee
ownership and to enforce franchise agreement provisions regarding noti-
fication of any franchise transfers.208 In Fernandez, a district court probed
the distinction between independent contractors and employees in assess-
ing whether franchisors were vicariously liable for a franchisee’s wage vi-
olations under the FLSA.209 Though many of the disputed issues remain
unresolved, Fernandez serves as a prescient warning to franchisors that
controls imposed in franchise agreements could create unintended and
unwanted employment relationships with franchisees and their
employees.210
The statutory claims cases probed a broad range of subject matters. In
Ferreira, the Dallas Court of Appeals demonstrated that the DTPA im-
poses a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs claiming a failure to disclose
information; the court of appeals affirmed a trial court finding that insuf-
ficient evidence existed to establish that the defendant knew at the time
of the agreement that construction delays would occur, much less that
defendant withheld relevant information with the intent to induce the
franchisee to enter into an agreement.211 In Saenz, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed a bankruptcy court’s conclusion that a franchisee’s state law claims
involved a “core” matter of the bankruptcy, providing the bankruptcy
court with jurisdiction to enter a final judgment on the state law claims.212
205. Id. at *6–7.
206. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-1502355, 2018 WL 2317604,
at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2018).
207. Saenz v. Gomez (In re Saenz), 899 F.3d 384, 393 (5th Cir. 2018).
208. Id. at 389 n.7.
209. Fernandez v. Jani-King Int’l, Inc., No. H-17-1401, 2018 WL 539364, at *1–2 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 8, 2018).
210. Id. at *4.
211. Ferreira v. Russell, No. 05-16-01235-CV, 2018 WL 3829231, at *1–4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
212. In re Saenz, 899 F.3d at 393–94.
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Lauter, another bankruptcy case, discussed issues of claim preservation
and standing.213 Lauter reiterated that debtors must include specific and
unequivocal language preserving claims following confirmation of bank-
ruptcy, or lose standing to pursue those claims.214 Finally, Wal-Mart
Stores involved successful constitutional claims by Wal-Mart against the
Texas Alcoholic Beverages Commission, specifically that Texas violated
the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in prohibiting
publicly traded companies from selling liquor in the state.215 Though this
case is pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the district court’s ruling has
the potential to dramatically affect the ability of franchises to sell liquor
in Texas.
This Survey’s discussion of remedies revisited several cases discussed in
earlier portions of the Survey, but with particular emphasis on the kinds
of remedies available to litigants—including damages, injunctive relief,
and attorneys’ fees. In Choice Hotels, the district court concluded that the
defendant intentionally infringed the franchisor plaintiff’s trademarks,
and awarded over $900,000 in damages based on estimates of the fran-
chisee’s profits during the relevant time period, royalty schedules con-
tained in the franchise agreement, and treble damages available as a
remedy for intentional infringement.216 In BL Restaurant Franchises, the
district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction requiring the fran-
chisee to keep its restaurant open according to the pre-termination provi-
sions in the franchise agreement, holding that because the franchisor
failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, it was not entitled to
injunctive relief.217 BL Restaurant Franchises illustrates the high burden
for parties seeking a preliminary injunction—Bar Louie’s failure to refute
the franchisee’s allegations that Bar Louie had failed to provide adequate
support and that it was financially impossible for the franchisee to keep
the restaurant open ultimately proved fatal to Bar Louie’s request for
injunctive relief.218 Finally, Choice Hotels and Stockade Companies of-
fered contrasting examples of the highly contextual and discretionary
analysis through which courts award attorneys’ fees; parties seeking fees
face a particularly high burden of proof where statutory provisions for
attorneys’ fees require evidence that the opposing party acted intention-
ally or in bad faith.219
213. Lauter v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. H-17-2028, 2018 WL 801601, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 8, 2018).
214. Id. at *10–15.
215. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 313 F. Supp. 3d 751,
756 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2018).
216. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-1502355, 2018 WL 2317604,
at *1–3 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2018).
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219. Choice Hotels, 2018 WL 2317604, at *3; Stockade Cos., LLC v. Kelly Rest. Grp.,
LLC, No. 1:17-CV-143-RP, 2018 WL 3018177, at *6–7 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2018).
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Taken together, the cases analyzed in this Survey provide a recent ac-
count of the most prominent changes occurring in the field of franchise
law in Texas. These cases illustrate continuing trends in franchise law ju-
risprudence and also draw attention to emerging legal issues which
franchise law practitioners should continue to monitor in the months and
years ahead.
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